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A Hawza is the establishment responsible for the training of Shia Islam’s Imams, 
preachers, professors and researchers. Its educational model, for hundreds of years, has 
involved the teaching of Fikh, Usul, philosophy, Quranic Studies and Arabic language. 
Over the past few decades, the social sciences, the systematic study of man and society 
which had emerged in the ‘west’, have been slowly making their way into these 
institutions, alongside a number of other changes. This paper will investigate, 
qualitatively, the religious training of Shia men of religion in Lebanon to explore the 
changes taking place within this institution. Based on a triangulation of participant 
observation, interviews with professors, students and stakeholders as well as content 
analysis of certain course material the paper claims a Hawza in metamorphosis. While 
structural and material alterations have straightforwardly made their way into the 
institution, content and curricular ones have faced more difficulty. These changes, reveal 
plenty about Islamic education and Shia Islam in Lebanon’s public sphere. Additionally, 
the paper raises questions and insights regarding both decolonial theory, Lebanon’s future 
and the geopolitics of the Arab world.  
 














Across religious traditions, the ‘criteria, process and outcomes of selecting, training and 
grooming future leaders’ is pivotal in the development of religion as both tradition and 
organization (Nesbitt 2007, 1).i In the Islamic world, there are several institutions 
responsible for the formation of religious scholars. For the Sunnis, a number of 
Madrassas, as well as academic universities and institutes, have long taken up the task. 
For the Shia, it is the Hawza. Graduates of these establishments take-up various roles 
within their communities: from mosque imams and preachers to teachers and researchers 
(Berkey 1992). Whatever their tasks, these graduates are, within religious communities, 
potent social agents engaging and contributing to the establishment of hegemonic 
discourses and the formation of social order. In a time where their rulings still hold ‘a 
greater legitimacy among the faithful than the civil laws passed by the state’ their belief 
systems remain central to the both the formation and the understanding of said social 
order (Sindawi 2007, 3). By consequence, the training of religious scholars, a form of 
power capable of manufacturing consent and begetting hegemony, presents itself as an 
issue of great value and relevance (Heywood 1994).ii 
Lebanon, a small post-colonial multi-cultural Mediterranean country where no clear 
identity exists presents itself as a captivating case study to shed light on the training of 
Islam’s religious scholars in the 21st century. Further, the political power balance 
governing the nation makes it a rich landscape capable of suggesting plenty regarding the 
happenings in other parts of the Islamic world. This paper will be limited to the Shia 
institution (Hawza), looking at changes within. Primarily, the paper is interested in 
investigating whether the social sciences have made their way into the training of Shia 
scholars. Also, it will scratch the surface of a serious gap in the literature by shedding 
light on a number of different (changing) characteristics in the Hawza; from curricular 
structure to the material setting of classes. The paper will close with a brief discussion of 
the implications of its findings.  
Up until the Islamic revolution in Iran, religiosity was not the norm in Lebanon, 
particularly for the Shia (Deeb 2005). Today, the situation is drastically different. 
Scholars of religion have played a central role in bringing forth this transition and, 
naturally, any alteration to their training is bound to influence Lebanon’s socio-political 
scene. Additionally, the investigation of the institution responsible for the formation of 
religion’s scholars promises great insights into the Shia landscape as well as its 
relationship to Lebanon the state. More important, perhaps, are the insights which might 
be brought forth by this investigation to decolonial theory. As attempts to reclaim non-
Eurocentric paradigms gain momentum, investigating non-western institutions promises 
plenty. While this is not the main research question of this paper, its findings will bring 
forth insights, observations and questions.   
It should to be noted here that this paper does not situate itself as an advocacy for the 
erasure of indigenous (here, Muslim and Shia) forms of knowledge in favour of those of 
the West and its modernity (here, the social sciences). This project is based on a dual 
assumption. The first is that the social sciences are not an exclusively western endeavour, 
as hard as Eurocentrism has tried to make it appear that way.iii The second is that, in a 
time of post-colonialism and continued imperialism, the social sciences, both in their 
western version and in alternative versions (if any) are essential for all public intellectuals 
across the globe. This is for a multitude of reasons, including the general 
knowledge/awareness, the heightened ability to understand and engage the social world 
and, most importantly, the critical thinking the social sciences have to offer their learner. 
Additionally, the project is tackling the inclusion of the social sciences alongside those 
fields of knowledge already present, not their replacement. Moreover, and even if one 
does not accept the above, debates on ‘authenticity’ and ‘western influence’ are not 
foreign to the Hawza and Muslim educational institutions. Rather, they are raging within 
these establishments under different forms and guises. This alone would justify such an 
inquiry.  
Henceforth, I will begin by summarily touching on the history of Islamic religious 
seminaries. After a short discussion of methods, I turn to the Hawza and the fieldwork to 
elaborate on the data of this research. Next, I briefly present the analysis of interviews 
with thirteen stakeholders/gatekeepers of the Shia religious educational institution in 
Lebanon to situate the data found within a more holistic frame. I will then end with a few 
analytical insights. 
History 
In terms of history, the birthplace of Islamic education was mosques, where subject-
specific study circles appeared with Islam’s appearance (Dodge 1962). Today, this is no 
longer the norm, and, for both Sunni and Shia, specialized educational institutions have 
acquired the role. The earliest documentation present, around the ninth and tenth 
centuries, describe mosques as Islam’s focal educational establishment (Haskins 1965).  
Accoridng to Mottahedeh (2006) education in Shia seminaries has, historically, had the 
following structure: every student begins with ‘Muquadimat’ where Arabic language, 
logic, and theology are covered. After this period students move on to Sutuh where they 
learn a ‘practical manual of law’ issued by one of the renowned Shia Marji’ of their time, 
complementing them with a number of books of Fikh. Then, the students begin taking 
Usul al-fikh: (basis/origins of Fikh) which are the postulates upon which the formation of 
religious legal opinions is to stand. Arithmetic, as well as the discipline of ‘transmission 
of hadith’, are also covered by this point. Additionally, Philosophy is given considerable 
time. Lastly, students enter a stage of Bahth al-Kharij where a specific topic is taken and 
opposing views, with arguments and counter-arguments, are systematically discussed by 
the study circle. The deliberations are usually heated, and the students are in the custom 
of trying to contradict the professor. This is based on the assumption that it is through 
attempting to refute the views of the professor that knowledge may be advanced, and it is 
here that emerging students establish scholarly worth, authority and legitimacy.  
With a pedagogy based on intimate tutorship, the schools consisted of simple rings 
whereby students sat on the floor in a circle, the closer to the teacher the higher their 
scientific rank (Mervin 2003). No rigid curriculum existed and, throughout, the system 
was one where students unreservedly attend different lectures, where examinations and 
homework are non-existent and where course duration varies with the variation of 
professors/students in attendance. Overall, and funded by independent charitable trusts, 
Islamic education sought to graduate scholars capable of interpreting religious text, 
issuing religious rulings and assuming vital public roles (Makdisi 1981). Up until the 
nineteenth century, the model had undergone little to no change (Mottahedeh 2006). 
For Shia Islam, the apex of scholarly achievement, which usually comes after no less than 
multiple decades of study, is reaching the level of Marji’ya; becoming a source of legal 
emulation for believers (Aziz 2001). It is only then, after a very rigorous and lengthy 
path, that a scholar gains the right to issue rulings and be ‘followed’ (Walbridge 2001). 
This must be preceded by Ijtihad, defined by Makdisi as being, ‘literally, the exertion of 
one's efforts to the utmost limit’ (Makdisi 1989, 3). Indeed, the Marji’ may, 
simplistically, be understood as the most knowledgeable of those who have reached 
Ijtihad. Based on the above, it might be said that the Hawza, translated by scholars such 
as Sindawi (2007, 4) as ‘the enclosure of learning’, is the customary, independent and 
persisting institution of Shia religious higher education through which one enters the field 
of research to, slowly and with time, establish their Ijtihad and, sometimes, later, their 
Marji’ya.iv.  
The Case and the Methods 
While Lebanon would appear as a country on the margin of Islamic religious education 
today, with Qom, Iran and Najaf, Iraq occupying centre stage, this has not always been 
the case. To the contrary, and as is often retold by Shia scholars in Lebanon, the Hawza 
of Jabal Amel (a historic geographical area covering parts of the Lebanese South and 
parts of the Bekaa valley) was once the regional hub of education and religious training 
(Chalabi 2006; Hourani 1986). The self-proclaimed inheritors of this prestigious Hawza, 
scattered across Lebanese soil today, are the case being elaborated on in this paper. As 
qualitative research, it will seek to understand, interact and analyse happenings to make 
sense and transfer a story (Burawoy,1998). Seeking an interpretive understanding of 
action, qualitative research was therefore applied to fathom the current state of affairs in 
the Hawza through the collection of data from its natural settings. This was pursued 
through a triangulation of participant observation, content analysis and semi-structured 
in-depth interviews (Burawoy 1998; Rubin and Rubin 2011). Through this triangulation 
of methods, I attempted to look at the institution holistically, produce a richer analysis 
and not reduce people or processes (Flick 1992). 
This study involved the investigation of six Hawzas, four of which are in the greater 
Beirut region, one in the Bekaa and one in the South. These included the three largest 
Hawzas of the country (Al-Rasoul Al-Akram/Al-Mustafa International University, Al-
Maahad Al-Sharii and Baqiyatollah) and three of the smaller ones (Al-Baker, Al-
Montazar and Imam Ali). The three large Hawzas chosen were the ones sponsored, 
funded or overseen by a major Shia religious figure (be it in Lebanon or in the region). 
The smaller Hawzas were chosen based on responsiveness and availability. In addition to 
the practical impossibility of investigating all Hawzas, the majority of small Hawzas are 
marginal personal enterprises with little impact.v The fieldwork was conducted between 
2015 and 2016, spanning around fifteen months in total. While registered as a student and 
attending classes at Lebanon’s major Hawza (Al-Rasoul Hawza), data collection was 
pursued at all six institutions.  
Theoretically speaking, the same process was to be adopted at all the institutions, with the 
exception of participant observation as a student. Practically speaking, data collection at 
some Hawzas was aborted early on, while at others some elements had to be conceded. 
The approach was as follows: I began with the collection of the curriculum maps for all 
years of study. After this was done, I looked for the courses that had the potential of 
containing a social science component, such as history, or ones that were outright social 
science subjects such as sociology, psychology, political science and the like. After 
having identified the courses of relevance, the syllabus/outline/description was retrieved 
from the administration, and the professor of the course was contacted for an interview. 
For each of these courses, the interview with the professor was followed by procurement 
of the textbook or material being given to students. In the case where there was no 
textbook and no material, I sought out lecture notes. In the case where such notes were 
not available, I looked at the reference books specified by the instructor or the syllabus. 
Naturally, full content analysis was only possible in the case where there was a clear 
textbook/material. Lastly, interviews with deans, professors, students and stakeholders 
were conducted.vi Interviews were often conducted at the Hawzas, particularly those with 
students and professors. These multiple visits allowed me to make the more general 
observations I include in what follows.  
Before proceeding, a few notes on methodology must to be mentioned. First, all the 
methods used are non-obtrusive minimum-harm methods seeking to assess an institution 
in dynamism. Participant confidentiality and voluntary participation were central tenets 
of the fieldwork. Whenever names are mentioned in this paper it is with the permission of 
the participant in question. On another hand, in terms of positionality, I am myself a 
Shiite born and raised a few blocks away from the main Hawza I spent over one year and 
a half attending as a participant observer. Indeed, the understanding I had at the 
beginning of this research, regarding the social role of religious scholars and their 
interaction with the Lebanese Shia community, was essential in directing the research and 
assuring representativeness just as it was essential in allowing communication and 
establishing trust. Nevertheless, this affiliation may, on the other hand, jeopardize 
objectivity. Conscious of such a bias, I took much care to preserve reflexivity throughout 
the research process, from reporting to analysis (Burawoy 1998; Ahern 1999). 
Nevertheless, I do not claim objectivity nor pure induction, but merely the simple 
reflection of perceived social realities.  
A summary of the fieldwork is presented in table 1 below: 
















3 3 7 None Four None 
3. Imam Ali 
Hawza 
1 1 8 None None None 
4. Hawza Al-
Baker 
1 0 11 None None None 
5. Hawza 
Baqiyatollah 
1 1 13 None None None 
6. Hawza Al-
Montazar 
1 0 7 None None None 
Table 1: Summary of fieldwork. 
The Hawza 
In Lebanon, up till the second half of the twentieth century, the Hawza coded student 
progress in terms of textbooks and subjects. The time allocated to a given 
subject/textbook could hence significantly vary, to fit both students and professors. No 
examinations were held, and most institutions did not require any academic qualifications 
for entry, beyond literacy, with students often joining between the ages of nine and 
fourteen. A large number of those joining, although not all, came from renowned Shia 
families, and the track was seen as a challenging one. The objective of this training was 
uniform: producing Mujtahids. Further, at least in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
no complete Hawza education was available in Lebanon: after a certain time (which 
varied across the years) students were expected to travel (mostly to Najaf, Iraq) to 
complete their religious education. In the 1990s this trend began to shift. vii 
Perhaps the most significant change is in terms of objective: what is the education offered 
at the Hawza and what does it seek? A few decades ago, the question was 
straightforward: jurisprudential and philosophical training. How far back the trend of 
strict specialization goes is contested, but many of my participants claimed that it 
emerged during the First World War, not before. Yet, no such clear answer is available 
today. In any case, the most important factor behind the current alterations has been, also 
according to many of my participants, the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
where, in Qom 2016, the Hawza offers over 160 different fields of concentration, 
including various social and human fields of knowledge. This, like many other changes in 
the Islamic republic, has rippled in Lebanon.  
In 2016 Lebanon, Hawzas function under the ‘Board of matters of the Hawza Ilmiya in 
Lebanon’. This board, established as a cooperation between the various factions of 
Lebanese Shiism,viii has elaborated a vision of the Hawza and specific guidelines to 
govern institutes, directors and students. The board has accredited twenty-two Hawzas in 
the country, distributed geographically as follows: Two in the Bekaa regionix, twelve in 
the greater Beirut region and eight in the south. No Hawza charges any tuition fees, to the 
contrary, they all reimburse their students.x All the ones with dormitories offer free 
accommodation to all their students (based on availability).  
In relation to the primary research question of this paper (the introduction of new fields 
of knowledge and the weight given to such fields in the training of scholars-to-be), the six 
Hawzas investigated may be classified into two categories: an established and an 
emerging model. Al-Rasoul Al-Akram/Al-Mustafa International University, Al-Maahad 
Al-Sharii and Al-Baker Hawza are emerging model Hawzas while Baqiyatollah, Al-
Montazar and Imam Ali Hawzas are ones following the established model. It is to this 
classification that I will now turn.xi 
The Emerging Model 
In what follows, I elaborate on each of the three Hawzas under this label. Before 
proceeding, a few points need to be made. The first is that this labelling, like any 
labelling, is simplistic. Naturally, the Hawzas discussed vastly vary. Yet, it is useful, 
especially regarding the research question of this paper. Second, it must also be 
mentioned that what is presented here is based on an in-depth systematic analysis. Due to 
the limitations of space, such an analysis could not be elaborated on. Lastly, while a 
comparative structure has been adopted in presenting ideas, it is lacking at many 
instances; mostly because of differences in the nature of the institutions, but also 
sometimes because of the lack of data.  
Al-Rasoul Hawza 
Al-Rasoul Hawza is the largest Hawza in Lebanon, and the main site of investigation for 
this research. It is considered as the most prestigious for a number of reasons: from its 
history to its sources of funding. More importantly, its teachers are the grand public 
religious intellectuals of the Shia religious community. Additionally, it often boasts 
fellows from the Qom seminary as visiting professors. It is located in the southern suburb 
of Beirut and is spread out over multiple buildings. Its student body is of around 300 
males, with over 150 of them living in Hawza dormitories. As of 2016, a large complex is 
under construction to which the Hawza is expected to move within the few coming years. 
The Hawza offers tracks for both males and females, with some differences in curricula.xii 
The Hawza was established in 1983 by a group of scholars, whose names are unclear 
today, and has been growing, under the patronage of the Islamic republic in Iran, ever 
since. This has had its huge influence on the Hawza, manifested in its architecture and 
Persian-style courtyard. The Hawza identifies the Marji’ya of Sayyed Ali Khamenei and 
the compliance with its views as its overarching tenet. Since its inception, it has always 
been headed by an Iranian scholar.   
The Hawza houses a significant Library, in comparison to other Hawzas and institutions 
of higher learning in Lebanon (including academic universities). Within this library, there 
is a section dedicated to the social sciences and social thought. This includes books on 
sociology, psychology, political science as well as a number of other related fields. Books 
covering western thought and works by European and American intellectuals/scholars 
were also found.  
In term of program, it has a structured program running over eight years, significantly 
less than the norm of ten to twelve years. Its teaching days are Monday to Friday and it 
observes a three-month summer vacation, again in breach of the old model where 
education was year-round, and the weekly holiday was Friday. Yet, the Hawza does not 
observe official Lebanese holidays. Its classes begin early on, at 6:50 am, generally 
ending at around 11:30 am. Lessons are no longer held in rings or on cushions, but rather 
in a western-academic-style classroom with chairs, desks and boards. All the courses 
offered are mandatory for all students, there are no electives and no choice of classes, 
again in stark contradiction with the established Hawza model where the Hawza had 
multiple professors teaching the same classes and where students chose the class they 
preferred, with no conditions/constraints.  
In terms of admission requirements, the Hawza does not admit students who have not 
acquired the Lebanese Baccalaureate or an equivalent academic degree entitling 
university-level entry. Further, Al-Rasoul is known for its cooperation with the 
International Mustafa University based in Qom. Over the past few years, it has practically 
transitioned into a branch of the International University, keeping both names. As of 
2017, it has not been accredited by the Lebanese Ministry of Higher education as a 
university. Due to this fact, it continues its agreements of cooperation with the Islamic 
University of Lebanon, entitling its student a degree in ‘Islamic Studies’ from the Islamic 
University of Lebanon after four years of study in the Hawza. Al-Rasoul divides its 
program into three phases. The first of these is the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree, the 
second the equivalent of a master’s degree and the third the equivalent of a PhD. Bahth 
al-kharij may be seen as a sort of post-doc training. 
In the second and third stages, the student’s education is limited to a number of Usul and 
philosophy classes; the Hawza student’s real ‘specialty’. No social sciences classes are 
taken during these phases; the ‘general’ courses are given during the first four years of a 
student’s training. The organization of study at the Hawza begins with a BA phase which 
is four to four and a half years long, followed by an MA phase, which is two to three 
years long. Once completed, the MA students may pursue a PhD which normally takes 
three to five years of study. Currently, two MA tracks are available in Lebanon: the ‘MA 
in Islamic Fikh and bases’ and the ‘MA in Quranic explanation and sciences’ (Introduced 
in 2015). 
In what follows I elaborate on the current curriculum being offered by the Hawza. It 
ought to be noted that this is not an analysis of the theoretical curriculum found in the 
Hawza guidebook. This distinction is important as there are substantial differences 
between the curriculum in the guidebook and the curriculum on offer. The major variance 
is the fact that there are four social science subjects stated as part of the curriculum, but 
which are not offered by the Hawza, and have not been offered for over eight years. 
These are the courses om sociology, introduction to psychology, educational psychology 
and child developmental psychology. Additionally, classes on computer literacy, modes 
of preaching and foreign languages all figure in the curriculum but are not offered by the 
Hawza. Inquiring, I discovered that these courses were on offer for a number of years 
starting in the early 2000s, were then cancelled, then reinstated and then, around 2010, 
cancelled again.  
The subjects are organized in terms of credits with each course being around four months 
long, equivalent to a one-semester course in academic universities. The six subjects 
receiving most weight and credits are, in decreasing order, listed below:xiii 
1- Fikh and Usul 
2- Arabic Languagexiv 
3- Quranic studies 
4- Islamic doctrine 
5- History 
6- Philosophy  
None of these courses are directly related to the social sciences, except for history. This 
class was investigated (content analysis of material as well as interview with instructor), 
in addition to the three other classes on offer and of relevance. These are the courses 
‘critique of western social thought’, ‘the political thought of imam Khomeini’ and 
‘research methods’. The content analysis of the material offered in these courses revealed 
three trends: very weak engagement with western academia, theory as the only issue of 
concern and the restriction of legitimate knowledge to textual one. These trends were 
confirmed through the interviews with the professors teaching these courses. 
Moreover, the interviews with the five professors teaching the topics of relevance 
revealed the thin line they were treading. All the professors agreed as to the need for 
change and amelioration in the Hawza curriculum. At the same time, all five professors 
expressed suspicion as to the validity of ‘western knowledge’, stating a need to approach 
these sciences critically rather than as givens. The professors seemed encouraged to 
engage the west, refusing to accept its knowledge as a given and wary of how exposure to 
it might influence the students. Four out of the five had academic training (the professor 
teaching history did not). One of them was trained in the social sciences, one in 
philosophy and two in Islamic studies. Additionally, all professors stressed that a holistic 
education does not need to contradict a solid specialist training, but that this is difficult to 
achieve in practice.  
In parallel, twenty students from the Hawza were interviewed. There was unanimous 
agreement as to the need for the inclusion of the social sciences within their training. The 
students generally expressed satisfaction with their training but also stated that the Hawza 
is an establishment in need of reform. Echoes of the calls of Sayyed Ali Khamenei were 
particularly significant as many students referred to him to legitimize their claim for 
‘change and progress’. Nevertheless, most students did not see conducting fieldwork as 
something a man of religion can/should do. Somewhere, it also appeared that the students 
placed great emphasis on academic specialty and asserted that ‘sheikhs are not experts in 
everything, they should not be in charge of everything’.xv This was accompanied with the 
feeling that different Sheikhs ought to be experts in different fields. The majority of these 
students are jointly registered at an academic university, mainly the Islamic University of 
Lebanon or Al-Maaref University.xvi 
Al-Maahad Al-Sharii 
Al-Maahad Al-Sharii is a significantly large Hawza, with around 200 students, located in 
Beirut’s southern Suburb. It is part of a large complex affiliated with the institutions of 
Sayyed Mohamad Hussein Fadlallah, such as a television station and a radio station. The 
Hawza itself is composed of multiple buildings, including gardens and a library. The 
Hawza was established in 1983 by Sayyed Mohamad Hussein Fadlallah. Its board of 
directors was at the time of investigation, as it had always been, formed of both Lebanese 
and Arab scholars.  
The Hawza’s Library is not a large one, encompassing around 3500 books, according to 
the Hawza administration. Its main themes are those of Hadith, Fikh and Quran. 
Nevertheless, one can locate sections designated for psychology, political sciences and 
contemporary issues/sociology. 
The academic year is structured along the lines of western academic universities. The 
Hawza runs its classes early in the morning, starting at around 7 am and ending at around 
11 am. It encompasses a dormitory and runs its programs for both males and females, 
segregated. It has abandoned cushions to adopt chairs, desks and whiteboards. 
Its official curriculum runs for nine years, after which the student begins the Bahth al-
Kharij stage. Throughout these nine years, a total of 115 courses are offered, with 
varying weights. Each course is around four months long, equivalent to a one-semester 
course in academic universities. The six subjects receiving most weight, in decreasing 
order, are listed below: 
1. Fikh and Usul 
2. Arabic Language 
3. Philosophy 
4. Islamic Doctrine 
5. Quranic Studies 
6. Logic 
Of these courses, four may be classified as social sciences.xvii Together, these make up 
eighty credit hours out of around 5100 credit hours (1.56% of total credit hours offered). 
The courses titled ‘methods of thinking’, ‘scientific research’ and ‘world religions’ were 
investigated in-depth. These revealed attempts to widen the scope of knowledge the 
students receive through offering them information on different cultures, religions and 
civilizations. It also revealed the weak engagement with academia, the fact that textual 
knowledge is held supreme and the fact that these courses are considered as ‘second 
class/service courses’ by the establishment.  
In addition to the above, the Hawza administration stated that it has two weekly recurring 
events: a general discussion every Wednesday and a gathering every Thursday where a 
selected student gives a speech. The purpose of these is, according to the administration, 
to get students to improve their social and presentation skills. Particularly of interest, the 
general discussion takes up (weekly) a different topic for discussion. There is no pre-
assigned list of topics, but issues in contemporary thought and social theory have often 
been debated, according to the institution’s academic director.  
Seven students from Al-Maahad Al-Sharii were interviewed. All interviewees stated that 
the Hawza must introduce its students to the social sciences. Three students expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the way the Hawza has been introducing ‘non-traditional’ fields 
of knowledge into its curriculum. They claimed that this has been done with little 
planning and organization, making it quite cumbersome for the students, as well as 
inefficient. Most students were registered at academic universities. Most of them also 
asserted they were seeking to become ‘specialists’, perceiving their academic degree as a 
supplement.  
Additionally, three professors were interviewed from Al-Maahad Al-Sharii. Al-Maahad 
seemed to have a very heterogenous faculty: with some professors holding PhD degrees 
(including one with a PhD from a British university) and others not having had a high 
school education. Despite this, all three lecturers interviewed asserted the need for change 
within the establishment and the need for the introduction of the social sciences into the 
curriculum. Two of them had reservations as to the introduction of fieldwork or social 
research methods, explaining that this was not the role of a religious scholar. These two 
professors also expressed their fear of the Hawza becoming a place too loose where what 
once was a solid training turns into a boneless ‘general culture’ one. This was 
accompanied with the assertion that people already see the scholar as someone who is 
expected to know about everything, while this should not be the case. Interestingly, one 
of them lamented how he had recently received a call from a woman asking for ‘marital 
advice’ saying that she ‘should be seeing a psychiatrist or a marriage counsellor, not a 
sheikh’.  
Al-Baker Hawza 
While Hawzas such as that of Al-Rasoul are spread over a complex of over six buildings, 
and growing, smaller Hawzas such as Al-Baker are limited to single apartments in 
residential buildings. In the case of Al-Baker, this is an apartment with no more than six 
rooms, located in the Rweis region, in Beirut’s southern suburb. The Hawza’s entire 
student body does not exceed the forty students benchmark, spread over two schedules: 
one in the morning (6:30 am to 10:30 am) and one in the afternoon (4 pm to 7 pm).  
The Hawza was established in 1999 by a group of independent scholars. In terms of 
admissions requirements, the Hawza does not admit students without an official degree 
equivalent to the Lebanese baccalaureate entitling university-level entry. Its teaching 
days are Monday to Friday. It observes a three-month summer vacation and does not 
observe official Lebanese holidays.  
Al-Baker, for a number of practical reasons, is currently not offering classes beyond the 
fifth year of study. While it holds many features in common with the emerging model, 
especially in terms of the inclusion of new fields of knowledge, it has preserved some 
features of the established model. For example, it uses the mainstream classification of 
‘stages’, unlike the larger Hawzas where the terms of the academy have been adopted. It 
also has some classes where students still sit on mattresses, in rings.  
Over around seven years of study (theoretically speaking), students undergo a program 
which is somewhat divided into seven study cycles. The Hawza measures the progress of 
its students in terms of books and there is no rigidly set time for the achievement of any 
single book. The topics covered are the same as in any Hawza, from Arabic language, to 
Fikh and Usul, logic, Islamic doctrine, Quranic studies and philosophy. Nevertheless, 
some textbooks covered in the Hawzas following the established model are left-out here. 
Due to the absence of any accurate and clear curriculum map, especially since the Hawza 
is ‘constantly mutating, changing and adapting’ both adding and removing subjects (in 
the words of its director), a numerical analysis of the courses offered was impossible. 
Nevertheless, it may be confidently said that the six subjects receiving most weight, in 
decreasing order, are listed below: 
1. Fikh and Usul 
2. Arabic Language 
3. Logic 
4. Philosophy  
5. Quranic Studies   
6. History 
On another hand, the Hawza’s published curriculum-map states many courses related to 
the social sciences (principles of sociology, principles of psychology, principles of 
Islamic economics, principles of Islamic education, introduction to Law, theory of 
knowledge and teachings methods). Currently, and for more than five years now, none of 
these courses has been offered. The Hawza administration said that it has recently 
introduced a program by which the contents of these courses, complemented by other 
subjects which may be classified as ‘general requirements’ in academic terms, have been 
shaped into workshops to be given to students, distributed over the years of study. The 
Hawza was not cooperative in providing references or material for these workshops.  
Eight students of Al-Baker Hawza were interviewed for this research, covering the 
various levels of study. The students were not very satisfied with their experience at the 
Hawza and were found to be attending it because they thought it was less demanding than 
other Hawzas; it worked well with their other commitments. The students were asked if 
the Hawza offers them any training in the social sciences and if they think the social 
sciences are essential to their formation. All interviewees said that there are no subjects in 
the social sciences on offer. All students also expressed that they would have ‘liked to 
learn’ about the social sciences in the Hawza as they deem the topics ‘important’ for their 
formation. 
No professors except the director could be reached for an interview. The director, himself 
also a teacher and a graduate of the Qom Hawza, expressed his belief in the need for 
change and reform. Adamant that the old model is not fir for ‘our current times’ he 
lamented the difficulty of changing habits and tradition. According to the students, the 
majority of their professors hold university degrees and believe in the need for a higher 
interaction between the academy and the Hawza. These claims could not be further 
examined. 
Synthesis 
In terms of courses, the emergent model Hawzas offer a variety of courses, changing 
weights as a student progresses. The central subject in these establishments are Fikh and 
Usul, language and Doctrine/Philosophy. These Hawzas have generally drifted away 
from the longstanding Hawza model with the introduction (or attempts at the 
introduction) of a number of fields of knowledge, such as theory of knowledge or 
introductions to the social sciences, just as they have changed the weight offered to some 
fields, such as ethics/Irfan and history. All three Hawzas have chosen to shorten the 
length of study, with the largest two having chosen to take up the academic model of set 
years, semesters and credits. This has often been accompanied with structural and 
physical changes, of different sorts.  
Within these Hawzas, engagement with academia is weak while efforts are being done to 
promote a research approach to knowledge and learning. Courses other than Fikh, Usul 
and their affiliates are considered as ‘second/service level’ courses by the establishment 
and they are treated as thus by students and professors. Yet, a calling for change is 
powerful, and the social sciences are perceived as central to this (still) expected change. 
While it might never happen in the way it is planned, it has already begun changing the 
way professors and students perceive their establishment.  
Indeed, in terms of students, the students of these Hawzas all agreed on the need for 
change and the need to link the social sciences with the ‘religious’ ones. Students sought 
to become specialists, often of religious jurisprudence. Yet, even when this was their 
purpose, they expressed that social sciences should figure in their training.  
As to professors, it was clear that there is no homogenous identity for the Hawza lecturer, 
particularly across subjects. Further, many professors saw the definition of a Hawza as 
the establishment which should be graduating Mujtahids, and, based on that, the fields of 
knowledge it introduces are to be the fields which would serve this purpose. For many of 
the interviewed professors, the social sciences did serve that purpose. Also, even for 
those who did not take such a stance, the inclusion of the social sciences was rarely 
shunned. The professors appreciated academia and asserted the need to connect the 
Hawza to the ‘western academy’. Nevertheless, they also expressed deep suspicion of 
‘western’ sciences and warned that they cannot be taken and projected onto Islam and 
Islamic societies as is; a call to ‘humanize the social sciences’ emanated throughout. 
Finally, they were clear about the social role of the scholar: a social agent with a specific 
sphere of action rather than a leader whose authority covers all aspects of society.  
The Established Model 
In what follows, those Hawzas classified under the second model will be discussed. Due 
to constraints of geography, availability, time and resources, professors were interviewed 
at only one of these Hawzas (the largest one, Baqiyatollah). At the other two, interviews 
were limited to students, the general/academic director and some administrative staff. All 
these Hawzas do not charge any tuition fees, with their students receiving monthly 
remuneration. 
Imam Ali Hawza 
Imam Ali Hawza is said to be the most conservative Hawza in the nation. The Hawza is 
composed of a building located near the Iranian Embassy, although it is not affiliated 
with the embassy. It houses a significant library and a dormitory, where most of its 
students reside, including students whose original place of residence is nearby (such as in 
Beirut’s southern suburb). This is meant to create a certain ‘safe environment of 
learning’xviii where the student only focuses on acquisition of knowledge, away from 
mundane life’s distractions. It houses a significant library, mainly focused on issues of 
Islamic studies and lacking in coverage on the social sciences.  
The Hawza was established around the year 2000 by Sayyed Jaafar Mortada, a renowned 
Lebanese scholar, upon his return from Qom, Iran. It currently has around fifty-five 
students and over twenty-five professors. All students receive a monthly stipend. Besides 
the fact its teaching days are Monday to Friday and the usage of chairs and desks, it 
appears to share nothing with the westernized university model. There is no two-term 
division, and the summer vacation is much shorter than that of the westernized university 
model of two/three months. Also, the Hawza does not identify a sharp or determined set 
of years or semesters over which the curriculum must end. Normally, the Hawza requires 
around eleven or twelve years before a student can begin the Bahth al-Kharij stage. It 
follows the structure of Muqadimat, lower Sutuh, upper Sutuh and Bahth al-Kahrij. The 
Hawza runs its classes early in the morning, starting at 6:30 am and ending at around 10 
am. The Hawza does not offer its program for females and places huge emphasis on full-
time status (tafarogh, literally meaning to empty oneself from any other commitments). 
Additionally, the Hawza obliges its students to present weekly written reports on every 
class they attend, in addition to regularly monitoring the student’s notes. These reports 
must include what the professor had presented in addition to an in-depth discussion, 
including reference to multiple other sources.  
As the Hawza does not officially follow the academic model of credits, comparison based 
on credit distribution is not possible. Overall, the Muqadimat phase at the Hawza is given 
in around four years, followed by around seven years for both Sutuh put together. Based 
on the Hawza’s curriculum, it covers a little over thirty textbooks. The time it takes to 
cover each of these books is not predetermined or constrained.xix The fivexx subjects 
receiving most weight, in decreasing order, are listed below:  
1- Fikh and Usul 
2- Islamic doctrine 
3- Arabic language 
4- Philosophy 
5- Logic 
Imam Ali Hawza does not offer any courses which may be classified as social sciences.  
Seven students from the Hawza were interviewed. All seven agreed to the statement that 
‘Islamic scholars must be aware of, learn and engage with the social sciences’. Whether 
such a duty is the responsibility of the Hawza or not was not agreed upon, with two 
students stating that it is not. They all agreed that the Hawza was not offering them 
anything in terms of the social sciences, nor in terms of an engagement with academia. 
Baqiyatollah Hawza 
Baqiyatollah Hawza is the major Hawza of the Lebanese south. The Hawza is composed 
of multiple buildings over a significantly large piece of land located on the edges of the 
southern village of Toul. With multiple dormitories, most of its students live on campus. 
The Hawza has three libraries, with huge collections of books on issues of Fikh, Hadith, 
Quranic studies and philosophy. The social sciences are not completely absent from the 
libraries, but their presence is meagre.   
The Hawza was established in 2006 by several scholars who had just returned from Qom. 
The study year is not officially structured along the lines of western academic 
universities, but it is practically so: a two-semester model, with a summer vacation, is 
followed. Progression is structured around Muqadimat, Sutuh and Bahth al-Kahrij.  The 
Hawza runs its classes early in the morning, starting at 7 am. Classes end at around noon, 
only running for males. The Hawza reimburses all its full-time students. It has abandoned 
the model of mattresses in favour of chairs, desks and boards. 
In terms of admission requirements, the Hawza requires its students to have reached, but 
not necessarily finished, the High School level or its equivalent (approximately nine 
years of study). Its curriculum runs for nine years, after which the student begins the 
Bahth al-Kharij stage. As the Hawza does not officially follow the academic model of 
credits, comparison based on credit distribution is not possible. Overall, the Muqadimat 
phase at the Hawza is given around three to four years, followed by three to four years for 
primary Sutuh and four to five years for secondary Sutuh. Based on the Hawzas’ 
curriculum, it offers sixty-three subjects, with varying weights (time, number of 
textbooks to be covered, relationship to other subjects…), over the nine years of study. 
Each course is around four months long, roughly equivalent to a one-semester course in 
academic universities. The six subjects receiving most weight, in decreasing order, are 
listed below: 
1. Fikh and Usul 
2. Arabic language 
3. Ethics 
4. Quranic studies 
5. Islamic doctrine 
6. Philosophy 
Baqiyatollah Hawza does not offer any courses which may be classified as social 
sciences.  
Three professors from Baqiyatollah were interviewed regarding the changes taking place. 
As to non-curricular changes, all three considered what had taken place as something 
completely normal; natural. As to curricular changes, they all endorsed the changes 
occurring in Qom, Iran although they stressed the need for the Hawza not to lose its 
identity. No answer as to why Baqiyatollah had not introduced any changes could be 
obtained, with excuses ranging from ‘circumstances’ to the need for more time. They did 
not see the social sciences as an element of the production of someone who is only a 
Mujtahid, but rather as an element of the production of a preacher/orator who deals with 
people: a scholar with a public role. According to the interviewees, the more social 
sciences are included the more ‘public’ the expected role becomes. In that light, they 
spoke of a proposition to open a parallel track, where training aims at the production of a 
preacher and where the social sciences would be a main and central element. According 
to the interviewees, the Hawza is in the process of updating its curriculum to include new 
fields of knowledge.   
Eleven students from the seminary were asked as to whether the Hawza offers them any 
training in the social sciences and as to whether they think the social sciences are 
essential to their formation. All 11 stated that the Hawza does not offer any such training. 
Five students said that a slight element of the social sciences could be found in the ethics 
class and three said that such elements could be found in the history class, although 
indirectly. Nine of the 11 students said that the Hawza should cover such topics, while 
two said that the Hawza should not, as doing so will shift it off-course. For these 
students, such topics should be covered through individual readings, which the Hawza 
could play a supervisory role in. For them, this should not become a matter of courses 
and classes. It was also noteworthy that three students referred to the speeches of Sayyed 
Ali Khamenei to criticize their lack at their Hawza and to justify why such knowledge is 
to be taught at the Hawza (a sort of legitimization). Nine students were registered in 
academic universities, mostly in Islamic studies or other humanities courses at the 
Islamic University of Lebanon.   
Al-Imam Al-Montazar Hawza 
Al-Imam Al-Montazar Hawza is the most renowned Hawza in the Bekaa region, and one 
of the most prominent in Lebanon. The current head of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan 
Nasrallah, is a graduate of Al-Montazar Hawza; a fact the Hawza prides itself on. It is 
located in the city of Baalbek, composed of multiple buildings with a large campus 
surrounded by natural greenery. Its student body is composed of around 100 learners with 
a faculty of around fifteen professors. Its general director was Sayyed Abbas Al-
Moussawi (previous Hezbollah secretary general) in the early days of the Islamic 
resistance’s rise. Currently, it is headed by sheikh Mohamad Yazbeck, the head of 
Hezbollah’s Sharia council.  
Its program runs anywhere between eight and twelve years, making it slightly longer than 
most Hawzas in Beirut. Its teaching days are Monday to Friday and it observes a three-
month summer vacation. It runs its classes, like all the other Hawzas investigated, early 
in the morning. It has abandoned the model of mattresses in favour of chairs, desks and 
boards. 
In terms of admission requirements, the Hawza does not admit students who have not 
reached the secondary level of education (approximately no less than nine years of 
schooling). Al-Montazar has a ‘cooperation’ with the International Mustafa University 
based in Qom. It has not, nevertheless, transitioned into becoming a branch of Al-
Mustafa University the way Al-Rasoul has. At the time of writing this paper, it offered 
two tracks: its own and that of Al-Mustafa University. Students are free to choose which 
track they wish to take. As the Al-Mustafa university track (which is theoretically 
identical to the one found at Al-Rasoul) is new, and as most students were not registered 
in it (no precise numbers could be obtained), the original Al-Montazar track is the one I 
will look at here. 
For this track, there are no social sciences, no research methods, and no techniques of 
writing scientific research. Indeed, there is no focus besides Fikh and Usul and their 
associate fields. The six subjects receiving most weight, in decreasing order, are listed 
below: 
1. Fikh and Usul 
2. Arabic language 
3. Islamic doctrine 
4. Logic and Philosophy 
5. History 
6. Ethics 
Seven students from Al-Montazar Hawza were interviewed. All seven of them stated that 
Hawza students need to learn the ‘social sciences’ with five stating that it is an 
‘obligation’. They all agreed that the Hawza was currently not offering them anything in 
terms of these sciences or in terms of engaging academia. Four of them were registered at 
academic universities, all seeing it as a supplement to their ‘true’ study path.  
Synthesis 
The established-model Hawzas are understood as being those establishments where the 
relationship with academia and with the social sciences is weak to non-existent and 
where the institution is making no substantial practical effort in the direction of change. 
Their course offering is limited to core training in jurisprudence and subjects falling, 
strictly, under the label of Islamic sciences. Their programs are longer, as they see 
shortening them as a loss and a compromise. Their student body is smaller, as are their 
classes, and it is possible that they are attracting less and less students with time. They all 
place great weight on students living in Hawza dormitories, seeking to immerse the 
students in the Hawza scholarly milieu. The structure of their training is very weakly 
influenced by the academic western model, but none of them has kept the ‘study-circle on 
mattresses’ format.  
While a few of the interviewed professors and administration members were clear in that 
the social sciences cannot have a central position in the Hawza, this was certainly not the 
majority view. Many nuances exist, and it appears that the views of faculty members 
were not a reflection of the extant curricula. The apologetic tone found in the emerging 
model Hawzas, although weaker here, was also found. Yet, many at these Hawzas 
(particularly administration members presented in the section on stakeholders below) 
stressed that the Hawza has a clear model it should not abandon, especially as this model 
has ‘proven successful’.  
Even though students at these Hawza felt the need for change, they were unclear as to 
how this should be done. When expressing such opinions, the students seemed confident 
and at ease; they were not worried about the fact they were disagreeing with the 
administration of their establishment. It is possible that the work being done in Qom, Iran 
and the recession of the Najaf establishment (the hub of the conservative discourse) has 
granted much legitimacy to the call for change.xxi Nevertheless, many of these students 
exhibited scepticism as to the inclusion of the social sciences within curricula, with many 
perceiving them as something a student acquires through personal work, such as readings. 
Most students were jointly registered at a university but saw their occupation as that of, 
strictly, Talib Ilm (Seeker of knowledge). In this sense, the university was perceived as a 
supplement to the Hawza.  
Stakeholders 
The administrative board members of Hawzas in Lebanon, alongside the lead faculty 
members, are understood as being the interpreters, gatekeepers, disseminators and 
guardians of the Shia educational institution in Lebanon.xxii They are therefore identified 
as the stakeholders of the Shia religious education in Lebanon. Based on renown, and 
restricted by availability, I solicited interviews from these stakeholders. Fifteen were 
contacted, and thirteen were interviewed. Based on a synthesis of these interviews, a few 
points of relevance are mentioned here. Regarding the background of stakeholders, most 
of them have received an academic training. Out of thirteen stakeholders, nine have an 
academic training with seven having academic PhDs.  
On another note, interviewed stakeholders do not consider the ‘west’ as being an ‘other’ 
with a different epistemology. For them, the social sciences are based on ‘rational reason’ 
and, on that basis, they may, and should, be included in the training of future scholars. 
Acknowledging that the social sciences have a problematic genealogy, the fact that they 
are based on reason/rationality (an element they perceived as foundational to the Shia 
Islamic belief system), rendered this a surmountable handicap. Hence, there were claims 
that these sciences need to be ‘humanized’ as they are too imbedded in the west’s ‘history 
and culture’ and mixed with its ‘problematic beliefs and politics’. They are not to be 
rejected. They all expressed an epistemological divide separating the ‘hard sciences’ and 
the ‘social sciences’. The hard sciences give facts, and they are off-hands for the Hawzas. 
The ‘social sciences’ give ‘viewpoint’ and they are within the Hawza’s intellectual realm. 
Yet, this was not unanimously agreed upon and the claim that the ‘social sciences’ also 
give ‘facts’ existed. None of those interviewed expressed the view that both ‘sciences’ do 
not give ‘facts’. Referring to the current state within the Hawza, there was an apologetic 
tone whereby the lack of the social sciences in curricula is justified by referring to 
circumstances and the need for time. It was claimed that these sciences will slowly make 
their way as the ‘old guard diminish in influence and the Qom-led current strengthens’. 
xxiii 
 The sense that change is ahead, led by Iran, under the patronage of its supreme leader, 
was unanimous: it was found amongst the stakeholders affiliated with Hezbollah and Iran 
just as it was found amongst the stakeholders affiliated with the Najaf Hawza, with 
Sayyed Mohamad Hussein Fadlallah or with other factions of Lebanese Shiism. Overall, 
out of thirteen stakeholders, eleven insisted on the need for curricula changes and 
endorsed the current changes taking place. The two others stated that change is necessary 
but disagreed with the way it is currently being done. Their main objection was regarding 
the ‘blind inclusion of the social sciences’ and the increasing fragmentation within the 
institution.xxiv The participants also expressed an appreciation of academic study and its 
role in shaping scholars of Islam just as they expressed an affirmation of the value of 
specialization, both in terms of training as well as in terms of occupation. This came with 
the refusal of the notion that a sheikh is someone people should refer to in all matters.  
 
Overall, despite this kaleidoscope, there was general agreement as to the value of 
increasing student’s engagement with their social reality. Further, there was undisputed 
agreement as to the need to better the state of research within Hawzas. This included an 
inclination toward the production of grounded knowledge, using, perhaps amongst others, 
some research methods of the social sciences.  
Implications 
While what has been presented brings forth multiple insights to our understanding of 
Islamic education, its implications resonate far beyond the classroom. In this section, I 
will elaborate on three main axes, covering both the theoretical and the lived. Yet, before 
doing so, a brief note is in order. Today, Lebanon is a dysfunctional country with a weak 
state exercising feeble governance. Certainly, this is the result of decades of colonialism 
and neo-Imperialism laying the ground and rendering the present reality possible. 
Historically, I am referring to the French having built the Lebanese state on corruption, 
dysfunctional apparatuses and confessional fragmentation, all forged under French 
paternalism. More recently, I am referring to the regional and global power struggles 
which unfold and reverberate in the country. In this sense, the intersection of these factors 
is what allows the field of the Hawza to proliferate, multiply and branch out into the 
multiplicity described in this paper. In other words, the Hawza scene in Lebanon is only 
possible as a result of the failure of the Lebanese state, of its various weaknesses, 
absences and lacks. Had it not been so, the educational sector would have been regulated, 
structured and oriented.  
The first of the three point I wish to make in this section is one of a theoretical nature.  
Over the past years, the question of indigenous forms of knowledge, and the resistance 
against western epistemic hegemony, has been receiving increased scholarly attention.  
Indeed, multiple academic traditions now disown modernity and its project, from Greek 
rationality to its conception of history (Mignolo 2011). Yet, it appears that Shia scholars 
take no such stance. For my interviewees, their indigenous knowledge is not situated in a 
paradigm inherently distinct from that of modernity’s project. Rather, it is a modified 
version of it. This conclusion does not only build on the fact that efforts are being made 
to include ‘western’ sciences: it is equally based on the nature of those subjects which 
constitute the Hawza education, both historically and contemporarily. For example, 
philosophy, at the Hawza, is based on Greek logic while history diverges very little from 
modernity’s understanding of time. As these institutions grow and spread they shift the 
frame of reference, of legitimization and of knowledge forms within the Lebanese Shia 
community. Yet, they are shifting it to a model not too dissimilar, in both its form and its 
content, from that of modernity and the west. Hence, these insights reveal that the 
decolonial project in Islam is significantly more complex than it might first appear. 
Overall, as decolonial theory has not yet been put into sufficient conversation with Islam, 
this work demonstrates the need for cautious treading and a distinction between an 
Islamic decolonial project and other decolonial projects.  
The second point relates to the relationship between Iran and the Shia of Lebanon. While 
this relationship is certainly not new, the hegemony achieved might be claimed as so 
(Abisaab 1994). In the field of religious education, Iran has certainly made huge efforts to 
reshape Islamic education since its establishment as an Islamic republic. Realizing that all 
but one of the Hawzas investigated are headed by graduates of the Qom seminary, in 
stark contrast to occurrences as recent as the nineties when all Hawza heads were 
graduates of Najaf, the shift is unmissable. At the level of subjects and textbooks, huge 
variations toward the Qom model have also taken place. Additionally, the hegemony 
achieved by Sayyed Ali Khamenei’s discourse stands as a striking example: his words are 
consistently and universally brought forth, by both students and professors, to legitimate 
claims, challenge the institution and denounce the old Najaf model of education. Present 
throughout, in those Hawzas funded and affiliated with Iran as well as those belonging to 
other schools, this research (re)affirms and elaborates on Iran’s increasing command in 
Lebanon.  
The third and final point concerns religion, Islam, in Lebanon’s public sphere. While a 
Mujtahid issues religious (legal) opinions, with a role limited to extracting knowledge 
from text, it is clear, at least for my participants, that a graduate from a Hawza where the 
social sciences are central fields of knowledge inhabits a different space. While this is not 
the current reality (yet), the ripples of the calls for change are, even now, observable. If 
this project of change succeeds, its effects might be colossal as changing the Hawza and 
its curriculum is bound to alter the identity of graduates: from scriptural scholars to ones 
with both a broader, more critical, understanding as well as a heightened aptitude at 
engaging the public. In a post-modern time of media and globalization, such attributes are 
bound to lay the ground for scholars to exercise increased power over the Shia 
community. As religion and politics are deeply entwined in Lebanon, the increased sway 
of men of religion on the Shia populace will certainly lead to an increase in political 
Islam’s hegemony and, by consequence, that of Hezbollah.  
With an increase in numbers, and with sheikhs inhabiting dominant roles in the Shia 
political lifeworld, it appears that Shia men of religion in Lebanon are only headed 
toward an increased public and socio-political presence. Hezbollah’s nomination of a 
sheikh for the 2018 Lebanese elections, a first, is clear evidence. Also worthy of note are 
the characteristics and the identity of those who choose to undergo a Hawza training: 
while becoming a religious scholar was, historically often by default of one being born 
into a ‘scholarly family,’ new rules are being moulded. Today, people from different 
backgrounds, materially and other, are entering the Hawza with various objectives: the 
Hawza is (already) no longer limited to graduating scholars occupied with Islamic 
jurisprudence. Hence, while the interviewees complained of a public perceiving them as 
‘experts in everything’, and as they claimed to want their role circumscribed, if the 
Hawza continues the path it has begun treading the role of a Shia scholar is only headed 
toward an increase in both breadth and depth.  
Conclusion 
An institution functioning outside Lebanon’s mainstream; observing different holidays, 
following a different educational model and without any coordination with any Lebanese 
ministry, the Hawzas of Lebanon have historically been institutions seeking to produce 
Mujtahids: religious scholars capable of issuing religious rulings. While this continues to 
be the case, the institution is certainly on the path of change. In this direction, many 
Hawzas have adopted the western academic model of set years, semesters and credits. 
This model has also been accompanied by multiple material modification. Interestingly, 
both material adjustments and structural modifications to the curriculum have been easily 
absorbed. Changes to content, however, have not been as smooth. As of writing this 
paper, the Hawza mainly offers courses in Fikh and Usul, Arabic language, logic and 
philosophy, Quranic studies and history. In attempts at change, some Hawzas have 
introduced courses in the social sciences. Yet, the standing of such subjects remains 
infirm, especially as they are repeatedly removed and re-introduced. Broadly speaking, 
the social sciences in the Hawzas of today, as an element of training, have not yet gained 
significant recognition, nor have they gained substantial legitimacy. Further, only theory 
has managed to break through. Nevertheless, the dominant discourse within the Hawza is 
one of change. This holds true for stakeholders, professors and students, quasi-
unanimously for the latter group. Overall, between an institution manacled by its 
heritage, encapsulated in the yellow books and the drained methods of old, and a Hawza 
which is a ‘westernized university’ in Islamic dress, the ongoing transmutation is 
ambiguous, and the threats are huge. Yet, so is the potential. 
Beyond Islamic education, this paper has raised serious questions for Lebanon: what 
would the changes being proposed in the Hawza mean for the future of religious scholars, 
to their formation, identity and role? What would the inclusion of the social sciences do 
to the general knowledge, the awareness, the skills and the critical thinking of these men 
of religion? What would such changes mean to religion and its presence in Lebanon’s 
socio-political public sphere? While the answer is complex and unclear, it is certainly in 
the direction of greater public presence and an increase in the socio-political role of 
Lebanon’s Shia men of religion. This has only been possible as a result of the Lebanese 
state’s absence whereby Hawzas freely diverge and converge to form an incoherent, 
heterogenous and dynamic field. A rich example of how colonialism, neo-imperialism 
and geopolitics intersect to produce contemporary reality; what was described is also an 
empirical (re)demonstration of the Iranian model’s mounting hegemony in the Shia 
world. To close, beyond Lebanon, these findings raise serious questions and challenges to 
what has come to be known as decolonial theory; showcasing the complexity of an 
Islamic decolonial project while simultaneously demonstrating its indispensability.   
                                                          
i It should be noted that Islam has no ‘clergy’ which can be compared to that of Christianity.  
ii Finke and Dougherty (2002) have theorized what they call ‘religious capital’, in building on the work of 
Bourdieu (1986). While this is of great relevance, there are mass differences between the context in which 
they worked and the context of this work. As exploring these differences is beyond the scope of this 
paper, such theorizations were not incorporated. 
iii This discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. For further information, refer to Bhambra (2007).  
iv The transition from Mujtahid to Marji’ is not based on a complex process which is beyond the scope of 
this paper. For further information refer to Walbridge (2001). 
v This is based on an ethnographic observation and conversations throughout the fieldwork. While there is 
no literature on the issue, it is clear that a hegemony of the major Hawzas, backed by the major Marj’, is 
well-established. 
vi It is to be noted that no hierarchy of credibility was assumed between students, professors and 
administration. 
vii This information is based on interviews with the administration of Al-Rasoul Hawza cross-referencing in 
all six Hawzas.  
viii Mainly Hezbollah, the higher Shiite council, the Amal movement, the Institutions of Sayyed Mohamad 
Hussein Fadlallah, among others, have acknowledged/been involved with this board.   
ix A professor at Al-Montazar Hawza claimed that there are over ten Hawzas in the Bekaa region. 
According to sheikh Amin Termos, a member of the board of trustees, only two meet the criteria for 
accreditation were found and these are the ones mentioned in the guidebook.  
xxx This is a very small sum for Lebanon’s living costs, in the range of 75$ to 150$ per month.  
xi Due to the baggage which comes with terms such as ‘progressive’ or ‘traditional’ the terms ‘emerging’ 
and ‘established’ are being used. 
xii The differences often relate to structure and added substituted courses. They are beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
xiii All such lists in this paper, unless specified otherwise, were generated through the calculation, and then 
the ordering, of weights allocated to subjects/books. 
xiv The books used to teach Arabic grammar are mostly ones written by scholars belonging to the Sunni 
denomination. During one of the classes attended at the Hawza, the professor stated that knowledge is to 
be sought after ‘regardless of the personal views of he who holds it’. This came as a reaction to a student 
inquiring as to why they study books authored by Sunni scholars where examples and stories are 
sometimes contradictory to Shia beliefs, leading to a class debate on Islamic unity. The sheikh claimed 
that students should not view the Sunnis as ‘others’ (he explicitly used the term ‘not to other them’). 
xv In the Shia communities of Lebanon, ‘Sheikh’ is only used to refer to a religious scholar.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
xvi They are often students of Islamic studies or of philosophy. At the time the fieldwork was conducted, 
Al-Maaref university had just opened and, being directly related to Hezbollah, many students had chosen 
to transfer to it instead of staying at the Islamic University which is affiliated with the Amal Movement 
and the Higher Islamic Shiite Council in Lebanon. 
xvii It was made clear, through interviews, that courses titled ‘Introduction to psychology’ and ‘introduction 
to sociology’, as well as other social science courses, were introduced to the Hawza a number of years 
back and were offered to students for somewhere between three and five years. These were later 
removed. 
xviii Words of its general director, Sayyed Ali Hijazi. 
xix This can range from five months to two years of study for a given book. 
xx There is no sixth subject given weight. All other subjects are given in great briefness.    
xxi See Khalaji (2006) for some information on the Najaf Hawza and the recession of its model. 
xxii The theoretical foundation of such a statement comes from work done on American Seminaries. Major 
examples include ‘Religiously Based Politics: Religious Elites and the Public’ by Daniel V. A. Olson and 
Jackson W. Carroll. (1992) 
xxiii Quotes from interviews with Hawza general directors. 
xxivxxiv These two were the general directors of Al-Imam Ali Hawza and a small Hawza in the South. This was 
also found among some administrative staff members at other Hawzas (all administrative staff at all 
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